Coordenação fiscal na presença de desemprego com barganha de salário : coordenação fiscal completa versus coordenação parcial

AUTOR(ES)
DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2010

RESUMO

In this work we analyze the welfare consequences of tax coordination. To this end, we extend the basic structure common to the models of FUEST and HUBER (1999b), KOSKELA and SCHOBER (2002) and WEHKE (2006 e 2008) to analyze, from the Nash equilibrium characterized by undertaxation, the welfare effects of complete and partial tax coordination, from the perspective of the mobility of production factors. In the complete tax coordination, one tax rate is marginally increased by all and the respective other tax rate is agreed to remain constant. In partial tax coordination one tax rate is marginally increased by all the countries, while the respective other tax rate can be freely chosen by all countries. As in KOSKELA and SCHOBER (2002) and WEHKE (2006 e 2008), we consider the labor market characterized for decentralized wage bargaining, that impacts an increase in the involuntary unemployment. Thus, this study extends the basic structure used by WEHKE (2008) and introduces heterogeneity in labor, where capital and skilled labor (human capital) have high mobility and labor unspecialized low mobility. It was shown consistency among results reached for the extension and the literature that substantiate the extension, and show some gains by the interaction with effects of the heterogeneity in labor. The complete tax coordination kept the gains in the presence of unemployment. On the other hand, of the partial tax coordination, the general welfare effect had been more complex and ambiguous, with dependence of the labor market structure.

ASSUNTO(S)

tributos negociação bem-estar social política de mão-de-obra economia partial and complete tax coordination wage bargaining involuntary unemployment taxation of the factor

ACESSO AO ARTIGO

Documentos Relacionados