DEFENSE-ATTACK INTERACTION OVER OPTIMALLY DESIGNED DEFENSE SYSTEMS VIA GAMES AND RELIABILITY

AUTOR(ES)

Lins, Isis Didier, Firmino, Paulo Renato Alves, Bezerra, Diogo de Carvalho, Moura, Márcio das Chagas, Droguett, Enrique López, Rêgo, Leandro Chaves, Santos, Carlos Renato dos

FONTE

Pesqui. Oper.

DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2014-08

RESUMO

This paper analyzes defense systems taking into account the strategic interactions between two rational agents; one of them is interested in designing a defense system against purposeful attacks of the other. The interaction is characterized by a sequential game with perfect and complete information. Reliability plays a fundamental role in both defining agents' actions and in measuring performance of the defense system for which a series-parallel configuration is set up by the defender. The attacker, in turn, focuses on only one defense subsystem in order to maximize her efficiency in attacking. An algorithm involving backward induction is developed to determine the equilibrium paths of the game. Application examples are also provided.

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